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Abstract 
The American War of Independence (1775-1783) spelled crisis for the British West Indies. 
Trade embargos between rebelling and loyal territories, losses to American pirates and 
hostilities with other European states left the Crown’s tropical Atlantic colonies short of the 
imported supplies that normally sustained their populations and commerce. Historians have 
studied the dynamics and consequences of these developments in considerable detail, at both 
regional and local scales, but have tended to focus on economic, social and political 
dimensions of the subject matter. Although some investigations have highlighted that climate 
variability compounded agricultural and subsistence problems in certain locations, the role of 
climate has rarely been subject to the same level of scrutiny. The present paper addresses this 
theme by focusing on the Lesser Antillean island of Antigua and the severe drought which 
gripped the colony during the war period. Through extensive analysis of original, largely 
unpublished archival sources, the implications of deficient rainfall for human livelihoods, 
fiscal stability and governmental crisis management are examined. By supplementing 
findings with evidence from other episodes of warfare which coincided with extreme climate 
phenomena in the late 1700s and early 1800s, it is argued that successive years of drought 
were pivotal in defining the severe human and economic losses sustained in Antigua during 
the American independence conflict. The critical agency of this weather event must, 
however, be understood as the product of its dynamic interaction with the precarious 
backdrop of a colonial regime under profound socio-economic and geopolitical stress.  
  
1. Introduction 
In early June 1777, the second battalion of King George III’s 60th Regiment made a desperate 
plea for aid. Word was sent to the legislature of Antigua—the British West Indian colony 
where the battalion was stationed—that the infantrymen could scarcely feed themselves due 
to inflated food prices. Indeed, their commanding officers believed that if the soldiers had not 
been issued with an advancement of their salaries, ‘many must inevitably have died thro’ 
want’.1 This was no state for the troops to be in. Britain was embroiled in an armed struggle 
to retain control of its North American territory. Meanwhile, the threat of interstate warfare in 
Caribbean waters was mounting. So it was that the troops’ appeal prompted decisive action. 
By August, the men had been awarded a pay rise, as well as a special allowance of £165 for 
purchasing supplies. But, within two months these additional resources too were exhausted 
and another call for aid was made. This time, the Antiguan administration was unable to 
assist, for the public treasury was empty. Fearing that the troops might starve, Sir William 
Matthew Burt, governor of the island, supplied £100 worth of food at his own expense.
2
 
Over the next 18 months, the state of affairs improved little. Drawing on the meagre tax 
revenues being collected at the time, local government eventually reimbursed Burt and 
resumed its support of the King’s troops. Yet, in April 1779—by which time over £800 had 
been spent on emergency rations—the soldiery remained in a ‘piteous Condition’.3 The cause 
was now not just hunger, but also a severe lack of drinking water. The only solution was to 
hire a private contractor to supply water at a rate of £4 a day.
4
 Ultimately, it proved that such 
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expenses were also unsustainable; within weeks the public treasury was declared bankrupt 
once more. 
How could it be that the 60
th
 Regiment, Antigua’s first line of internal defence, became 
exposed to such persistent privations? What was causing the prices of everyday necessities to 
soar? And why was a once flourishing colonial economy, founded upon the multimillion-
pound sugar industry, now so unstable? The conventional answer to these questions is 
geopolitics. From 1775, the severance of commercial relations with the rebelling North 
American colonies and conflict with other imperial powers resulted in profound subsistence 
and economic emergencies throughout the British West Indies. In the case of Antigua, 
however, there was another decisive force at play: intense and prolonged drought. The 
present paper draws on a range of primary archives—principally plantation and government 
records—to scrutinise the manifold societal consequences of this weather event and to 
explore its role in defining local experiences of the war period.
5
 In this way, the paper seeks 
to illustrate how a climate history lens can afford a novel perspective on this period of crisis.
6
  
Within the sub-discipline of climate history, the colonial period has come to represent a 
significant and dynamic focus of study.
7
 The Caribbean is a region of growing interest and 
has been the subject of several distinguished publications over the past decade. Matthew 
Mulcahy and Stuart Schwartz, for example, have presented wide-ranging hurricane histories, 
broaching themes as varied as colonial conceptualisations of the storms, their influence on 
imperial politics and institutional responses to the disasters they provoked.
8
 Meanwhile, 
Sherry Johnson has re-narrated a number of landmark socio-political events in the region’s 
mid-late eighteenth century past, emphasising their connection with crises featuring extreme 
weather phenomena—crises which she argues were especially frequent during this period of 
climatic warming. A key element of Johnson’s work are detailed, empirically-rich narratives 
of how disasters unfolded in their socio-political and ecological contexts, illustrating the 
ways adverse weather can act as a trigger for political and social change.
9
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There have been few climate histories focusing on the Lesser Antilles or the period of the 
American Independence War specifically.
10
 The present study addresses this scope for 
original investigation by applying an approach akin to that of Sherry Johnson to the case of 
Antigua during the American Independence War. Following a brief description of the 
environmental and socio-economic setting of the study, we examine in depth the anatomy of 
the crisis that affected the island between 1775 and 1783. Evidence is presented of the 
implications of drought for agricultural production, public health, socio-economic stability 
and governmental crisis management. This analysis is then supplemented with accounts of 
other periods of climatic stress (that is to say, other episodes when extreme weather events 
threatened colonial livelihoods) in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. By 
building upon this empirical foundation, we illustrate how drought—in particular, 
consecutive years of drought—played a critical role in defining the state of emergency that 
arose in Antigua during the war period. In as much, we conclude that climate acted with 
unique agency in the milieu of a precarious slavery- and monoculture-based colonial regime, 
stretched to breaking point by commercial and geopolitical forces. 
 
2. Context of study: environment, society and war 
Antigua lies at the centre of the Leeward Islands, the 300-km, crescent-shaped archipelago 
forming the northern half of the Lesser Antilles (Figure 1). The climate of this region is 
characterised by warm average temperatures of 23-25
o
C throughout the year and a 
pronounced annual pattern of precipitation and cyclonic activity. The wet season, which 
accounts for some two-thirds of rainfall, spans from May to November. It is marked by a 
relative precipitation minimum around June and a maximum in September-October. Tropical 
cyclones may be experienced throughout the wet season, though the average strength and 
numbers of these storms is significantly higher in autumn.
11
 With predominantly low-lying 
topography, Antigua generates little dependable ‘relief rainfall’. Consequently, the island can 
experience considerable year-to-year variability in precipitation levels, as well as severe, 
multi-year drought. Today, as in the colonial past, human vulnerability to drought has been 
amplified by Antigua’s lack of permanent major freshwater features, such as rivers and 
streams.
12
 
The long-term reconstruction of precipitation variations in Antigua spanning 1770 to 1890 
has been the focus of recent research. Based on the systematic analysis of descriptions of 
climate and weather phenomena in contemporary documentary sources, semi-quantitative 
chronologies of relative variations in rainfall levels have been developed for the island at 
annual and seasonal resolutions. Results indicate that the years 1776-1780 represented one of 
the longest continuous episodes of below-average rainfall levels in the reconstruction.
13
 As 
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the evidence indicates that drought affected much of Antigua for five years between October 
1775 and October 1780, broken by widespread precipitation only in September 1776 and 
October 1777.
14
 Below-average rainfall levels were again widely recorded between February 
1782 and May 1783, after abundant precipitation in October 1780 and mixed conditions 
during 1781. 
 
 
Figure 1. The Lesser Antilles and Leeward Islands. 
                                                                                                                                                        
sufficient evidence was available, each rain-year was assigned one of five classifications (very dry, dry, 
‘normal’, wet or very wet) to reflect the predominant balance of rainfall levels throughout the year across the 
island; (4) the process was repeated for the individual dry and wet seasons of each rain-year using direct weather 
references pertaining to a specific locality in central-eastern Antigua; (5) classifications were plotted to create 
two near-continuous rainfall chronologies, one for the whole island resolved annually for the rain-years 1769-79 
to 1889-90, the other for central-eastern Antigua resolved seasonally for 1769-70 to 1853-54. 
14
 As in the climate reconstructions published by Berland and colleagues, the present paper uses the term 
drought to refer to what is technically ‘meteorological drought’—a deficit in precipitation relative to average 
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These weather events commenced at the height of the West Indian age of ‘sugar and 
slavery’.15 The 1750s through mid-1770s witnessed the most profitable years of the British 
Caribbean plantation economy, with sugar commanding a high retail value, a powerful navy 
protecting shipments to the metropolitan market and continuous imports of West African 
slaves ensuring a cheap and abundant workforce. At this time, over 220 of Antigua’s 280 km2 
land area was accounted for by some 300 sugar estates. Operating a continuous yearly cycle 
of monoculture and quasi-industrial production, these holdings generated the capital that 
underpinned the entire economy. As the largest sugar exporter in the Lesser Antilles and the 
seat of British governance in the Leeward Islands, Antigua was a key commercial and 
political hub. It was also an important military centre, home to a major naval dockyard at 
English Harbour and a permanent garrison of troops—including the aforementioned 60th 
Regiment—which grew during the war years of the late 1700s. Nonetheless, the island’s 
society was as polarised as elsewhere in the British Caribbean. A small white population, 
which stood at roughly 2,500 in 1774, monopolised political affairs, trade and the profits of 
the sugar industry. Meanwhile, a 37,000-strong African-descended underclass—kept in line 
by a constant military presence and institutionalised violent discipline—faced an existence of 
enforced servitude. Though a sizable minority of non-whites received preferential treatment 
for domestic service or specialised craftwork, most toiled as field labourers under conditions 
that were gruelling in the extreme. Excessive mortality rates associated with inadequate food 
rations and high disease incidence were offset only by continuous slave imports, which 
reached an estimated average of 2,000 per year in the mid-1700s.
16
 
 
Table 1. Summary of evidence of rainfall levels in Antigua, 1775-1783, and examples of 
contemporary descriptors of these conditions, based on archival research by Berland and co-
authors.
17
 
Year Conditions Example descriptors 
1775 No conclusive evidence of weather 
conditions Jan.-Sept. 
n/a 
Deficient rainfall in Oct.-Dec. ‘little rain’, ‘very dry’, ‘severe drought’ 
1776 Deficient rainfall Jan.-Jul. ‘dry weather’, ‘very dry’, ‘severe drought’ 
Short showery spell in late May ‘tolerable showers’ 
Seasonable rains and a weak tropical 
cyclone in Sept. 
‘fine rains’, ‘three weeks of good rain’ 
Rainfall deficiency Oct.-Nov. ‘nothing of rain’ 
1777 Severe rainfall deficiency in all months 
except Oct. 
‘a scene of dry weather’, ‘excessive dry 
weather’, ‘great drought’ 
Seasonable rains in Oct. ‘good rain’, ‘a season of rain’ 
1778 Severe rainfall deficiency Jan.-Dec. ‘very dry weather’, ‘extremely dry’, ‘long 
severe spell of dry weather’ 
                                                 
15
 A thematic period explored extensively by Richard Sheridan, Sugar and slavery: an economic history of the 
British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 1974). 
16
 Richard Sheridan, ‘The rise of a colonial gentry: a case study of Antigua, 1730-1775’ The Economic History 
Review 13 (1961): 343; Sheridan, Sugar and slavery, 194-196; For other comprehensive accounts of slave 
society, see Barry Gaspar, Bondmen and rebels: a study of master-slave relations in Antigua (London: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1985), esp. chaps. 4-6; Andrew O’Shaughnessy, ‘Redcoats and slaves in the British 
Caribbean’, in R.L. Paquette and S.L. Engerman (eds.) The Lesser Antilles in the age of European Expansion, 
pp. 105-127 (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1996); Brian Dyde, A History of Antigua: the Unsuspected 
Isle (London and Oxford: Macmillan Education, 2000), pp. 85-92; Kenneth Morgan, Slavery and the British 
Empire: from Africa to America (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), chaps. 1-2, 4-5. 
17
 Berland, Metcalfe and Endfield, ‘Documentary-derived chronologies of rainfall’: 1332-1334; Berland, 
‘Extreme weather and social vulnerability’, chaps. 4-5. 
Localised showers in Apr. ‘some refreshing showers’ 
Some localised showers in Oct. ‘passing showers’ 
1779 Severe rainfall deficiency Jan.-Dec. ‘unsupportable dry weather’, ‘the severest 
drought’, ‘severe dryness’ 
Localised rainfall in Sept. ‘rains in some parts’, ‘flying showers’ 
1780 Rainfall deficiency Jan.-Jun. ‘severe drought’, ‘uninterrupted drought’, 
‘very long and cruel spell of dry weather’ 
Localised showers in May ‘partial rains’ 
Abundant generalised rainfall in Oct. 
with hurricane activity nearby 
‘best season of rain in years’, ‘greatest 
quantity of rain in a short time’, ‘good rains’ 
Rainfall deficiency Nov.-Dec. ‘good weather didn’t continue’, ‘weather 
unfavourable in the greatest degree’ 
1781 References to both dry and seasonable 
weather Jan.-Jun. 
‘not much rain’, ‘dry weather’, ‘rains partial’, 
‘favourable weather’ 
Intermittent rainy spells in autumn ‘copiously visited with showers’, ‘some rains’ 
1782 Severe rainfall deficiency Feb. to mid-
Aug. 
‘very dry weather’, ‘drought’, ‘exceedingly 
dry’ 
Showers in late Aug. with considerable 
local variability 
‘very fine showers’, ‘much rain’, ‘very little 
rain’ 
Deficient rainfall in Nov. ‘drought’, ‘a series of dry weather’ 
1783 Severe rainfall deficiency Jan.-May ‘no showers’, ‘great dryness’, ‘entirely burnt 
up’ 
Seasonable rains Jul. and Sept. ‘favourable, ‘very good weather’, ‘rains’ 
Abundant rains Oct.-Nov. ‘very wet weather’, ‘too heavy rains’ 
 
Despite the riches being generated by enslaved plantation labour, all was not well in 
Britain’s New World Empire during the early 1770s. Frustration with Crown rule in the 
thirteen longstanding North American colonies—which stretched from Massachusetts to 
Georgia on the east coast (Figure 2)—had reached fever pitch by 1774. This culminated in 
the resolution of the first ‘Continental Congress’ to ban all imports from Britain, Ireland and 
the West Indies as of December that year, a policy known as the Continental Association. 
Britain responded by launching an extensive military campaign against the rebelling 
provinces the following April, bringing an end to outbound trade, as well as the already 
suspended inbound commerce, between the Thirteen Colonies and the remainder of the 
Empire.
18
 The commercial embargo, which was upheld until American Independence in 
September 1783, spelled calamity for the British Caribbean. It eliminated the principal supply 
of hardware and raw materials fundamental to plantation operations (timber, tools, rope and 
machinery components), as well as the non-local foodstuffs that sustained the region’s human 
population (maize, flour and salted meats). Meanwhile, an increased military and naval 
presence to secure the island colonies increased pressure on supplies. Nowhere was the 
blockade felt more keenly than in the Leeward Islands, where sugarcane monoculture was 
most intense and, owing to the consequent neglect of subsistence agriculture, dependence 
upon imports was greatest.
19
 The situation worsened in the late 1770s, when hostilities broke 
out with other colonial powers. France entered the conflict in alliance with the Thirteen 
Colonies in March 1778, followed by Spain in 1779 and Holland in 1780. In the battleground 
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that the Caribbean became, the eastern islands once again bore the greatest excesses, 
witnessing a maelstrom of territorial gains, losses and re-acquisitions (though Antigua was 
the target of no major attack or invasion).
20
 
In this disastrous context, procuring provisions from new sources became vital for the 
British West Indies. From within the empire, supplies were sent from the British Isles and 
loyal North American colonies. From without, imports were periodically permitted from non-
hostile foreign dominions, which often served simply to redirect cargoes from enemy 
territory. At the same time, many British planters reduced reliance on imports by expanding 
the acreage devoted to subsistence crops, such as yams, cassava and potatoes, which slaves 
normally cultivated on small tracts of marginal land to supplement their imported rations. 
While this was a practise most widely adopted in the extensive fallow lands of Jamaica, some 
estate owners in the Lesser Antilles also replanted caneland with provisions.
21
 Despite such 
adaptations, the academic consensus is that the conflict of 1775-1783 precipitated an 
unprecedented crisis in the region. Famine and sickness ravaged slave populations, which—
overworked and underfed at the best of times—were acutely susceptible to food shortages. 
With a lack of crucial hardware coinciding with problems of labour supply, plantation output 
fell just as running costs rose. Prices of many staples more than doubled in the Leewards, 
while sugar exports from the British Caribbean plummeted by 40 per cent between 1774 and 
1778. The plantation economy also endured numerous secondary stresses, including 
increased taxes and shipping costs.
22
 In these ways, the social and political circumstances of 
the war period rendered Caribbean societies peculiarly vulnerable to further stresses, such as 
storms and droughts.
23
 
 
 
Figure 2. Britain’s original thirteen colonies in North America. 
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 3. Scarcity, morbidity and mortality in embattled Antigua 
3.1. ‘Ye horrors of a Famine every day stare us more & more in ye face’ 
Immediately before the turbulent war period, the British Leeward Islands had enjoyed 
consecutive years of commercial success. Writing in January 1775, the governor of the 
region, Sir Ralph Payne, enthused: 
 
The Trade of every Island… is uncommonly flourishing; Provisions of all Kinds from 
the Continent of America are cheaper and more plentiful than they have been in the 
Memory of Man; and the Crops for the present Year, promise to be much superior even 
to those of the last, in Quality as well as in Quantity.
24
 
 
In Antigua, consistently above-average rainfall levels were experienced between August 
1772 and October 1774, which contributed to a bumper sugar crop in 1774, succeeded by the 
largest of the eighteenth century one year later (Figure 3a).
25
 For their part, in 1775, the 
plantations of one of the largest landholders in the island, Sir William Codrington, generated 
the second highest yield then on record (Figure 3b). Committed to protecting their industry, 
planters reacted quickly to the news of deteriorating Anglo-American relations. While 
commercial channels with the continent remained open, purchases of provisions were 
increased to build up reserves. Simultaneously, reported one estate attorney, agriculturalists 
began to plant ‘every sort of Provisions’.26 However, the attorney also offered an ominous 
word of caution: should the supply of American produce halt, he noted, ‘we shall be reduced 
to great distress, especially if we have any long spells of dry weather, as we sometimes do’.27  
 
 
Figure 3. (a) Annual Antiguan sugar production and exports and (b) combined annual sugar 
production of the Codrington family’s principal Antiguan estates, 1700-1790.28 
                                                 
24
 CO152/55, Gov. Payne to Earl of Dartmouth, 12 Jan 1775. 
25
 Berland, Metcalfe and Endfield, ‘Documentary-derived chronologies of rainfall’: 1338-1339; Berland, 
‘Extreme weather and social vulnerability’, p. 70. 
26
 DD/TD/15/6, S. Blizard to C. Tudway, 21 Jul. 1775. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Data from Noël Deer, The history of sugar, Volume I (London: Chapman and Hall, 1949), p. 195; Vere 
Oliver, The history of the island of Antigua, one of the Leeward Caribbees in the West Indies, from the first 
 Unhappily for Antigua, it was not long before these preconditions were met; trade 
embargos between the thirteen colonies of North America commenced late in 1775, as did a 
protracted phase of precipitation deficiency (Section 2). On 29 December, plantation manager 
Francis Farley wrote to Sir Clement Tudway, another important absentee plantation owner, 
that Antigua’s provision reserves were running low. ‘People… would gladly appropriate [a] 
good part of their caneland to raising provisions,’ Farley asserted, ‘had we rain to plant 
with’.29 Complaints gradually became more strident as the concomitant pressures of dry 
weather and dwindling supplies mounted.
30
 Come April 1776, Mainswete Walrond, another 
of Sir Tudway’s estate managers, simply lamented: ‘ye horrors of a Famine every day stare 
us more & more in ye face’.31 Three months later, he added that island-wide water shortages 
had claimed the lives of ‘a great number of cattle’.32  
Fortunately for Walrond and his fellow Antiguans, the next twelve months brought brief 
respite; subsistence crops were sewn with showers in May and September,
33
 a temporary ban 
on exports slowed the depletion of stockpiles and the capture of American craft by British 
privateers supplied ‘Plenty of Provisions.’34 However, when maritime trade took its seasonal 
dip in the hurricane season of 1777, acute scarcities returned, drought having prevailed since 
the previous October.
35
 As early as July 1777, Farley noted that imported corn and beans had 
run out across the island, while local food and water sources were exhausted.
36
 Famine set in 
that autumn. In his next letter, dated 27 October, the estate manager exclaimed: ‘I believe 
from 1000 to 1500 Negroes will be lost in consequence of this scarcity; many are already 
dead’.37 Hunger continued through the opening months of 1778, proving Falrey’s fears 
alarmingly accurate.
 
In a letter to the Colonial Office in mid-March, the governor of the 
Leewards grieved: ‘from the best informations [sic] I have been able to collect, The Island of 
Antigua has lost above a thousand Negroes’.38 
 
3.2. ‘Its face the deserts of Arabia’ 
The crisis climaxed over the next two years. France’s entrance into the war left Antigua 
reliant upon perilous trade with the Empire and a few neutral states, as well as irregular 
captures at sea.
39
 Accounts speak comprehensively of these difficulties and the confounding 
affects of dry weather. Francis Farley, for example, penned the following in September 1778: 
 
It has been long extremely dry & more so at present than I ever before knew it, both 
Water & provisions are scarcer than they ever were in the Memory of Man and this 
without a prospect of relief as to provisions for a considerable time, [as] it is unlikely 
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that the fleet from London will be here before Christmas and should we be blessed with 
plentiful rains immediately we can’t raise any Provisions in less than four months.40  
 
Even the arrival of emergency supplies the following March could not avert disaster. At the 
start of May 1779, Governor Burt wrote of the Antiguan populace:  
 
Their present Crops are Distroyed [sic] by a long[,] very long severe Drought; nor have 
they now any prospect of a succeeding Crop: they have not had a thorough Season of 
Rain since October was a Twelve Month: Their Cysterns [sic] are and hav[e] been 
some time Emptied; their large Ponds are in the same State; they are compelled to carry 
Water for their Families’ use many Miles, for which they pay eighteen Pence a Gallon. 
Heavan [sic] has denied them not only Seasons but even refreshing Showers from 
whence they might raise Pulse and Vegetables or some Provisions for their Negroes… 
My letters from that Island paint nothing but ruin and its face the deserts of Arabia.
41
  
 
That September, Burt could only add that ‘many hundreds of Negroes’ had starved to death.42 
Contemporaries also reported vast (though un-numerated) mortality among the island’s 
cattle.
43
 
All the while, another ecological force amplified death and despair. In June 1777, doubts 
arose as to how long Sir Tudway’s slaves would remain healthy while drought obliged them 
‘to drink bad water’.44 Eleven months on, amid further commentary of the unwholesome 
quality of Antigua’s depleted water supplies, the first fatality of a widespread dysentery 
outbreak was registered on the absentee’s estates.45 Another year later, ‘all the Negroes in the 
Island’ were said to be ‘very sickly, chiefly with ye flux’.46 Records reviewed by colonial 
historian John Ward indicate that, overall, one tenth of Tudway’s slaves perished between 
summer 1779 and autumn 1780, primarily due to dysentery.
47
 Similarly, in 1778-1779, the 
death toll on two of Sir Codrington’s plantations, Betty’s Hope and The Garden, was 
calculated at 15 per cent.
48
 Yet, it seems that Codrington’s and Tudway’s workforce were 
spared the full excesses of the epidemic. When interviewed by parliament years later, 
Antiguan physician Samuel Athill estimated from his examinations that dysentery had killed 
between a fourth and a fifth of Antiguan slaves (i.e. some 7,500-9,000) in the years 1778-
1780.
49
 And it was not only the enslaved who suffered; Francis Farley, for instance, was 
named in a list of five whites who lost their lives in the epidemic.
50
 
Antigua’s situation improved temporarily from the summer of 1780, British food aid 
arriving, the dysentery epidemic abating and spells of wet weather in October and throughout 
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1781 gradually restoring water supplies and agriculture.
51
 The island was also singularly 
fortunate in escaping virtually unscathed from the devastating effects of a hurricane which 
tore through the Lesser Antilles in early-mid October 1780.
52
 However, subsistence problems 
did not disappear entirely; food prices remained high and scarcities again occurred in the 
1781 storm season.
53
 And, when drought returned at the start of 1782, so too did water 
shortages, livestock mortality and a floundering slave subsistence sector.
54
 Recovery began 
only in the summer of 1783, with the onset of nine months of wet weather and the war soon 
reaching an end.
55
 ‘We now have plenty of good water, & a tolerable quantity of grass, & I 
hope to get the cattle & mules in good order for taking off the crop’ acclaimed Mainswete 
Walrond towards the end of September.
56
 By this time, ‘great supplies of provisions & 
lumber’ had already been imported, trade with the now-independent thirteen colonies having 
recommenced early that month.
57
 
 
4. ‘To destroy the hope of the planter’: the political economy imperilled 
For most planters and government officials, who rarely lacked everyday necessaries despite 
high prices, dearth and mortality were of concern foremost for their impacts on the sugar 
industry. Harvest and export data (Figure 3) offer a useful framework for assessing 
contemporary ebbs and flows in this sector. Bearing in mind that annual totals reflect 
conditions throughout the preceding 12-16 months of cane growth and processing,
58
 notable 
coherence is evident between sugar output and the pattern of fluctuating material 
circumstances presented above; exports and production fall after 1775 to reach their nadir in 
1780, rise moderately from 1781 to 1782 and then collapsed once more in 1783. 
Drought was perhaps the most direct driver of decline. The archives contain countless 
references to its consequences for sugarcane cultivation, over timescales ranging from weeks 
to years.
59
 The earliest examples date from spring 1776, when Mainswete Walrond observed: 
 
ye weather continues very dry & ye Canes are burning fast thro all ye Country which 
will soon alter ye quality of ye sugar much & lessen ye quantity.
60
  
 
When, in 1780, sugar yields plummeted, the predicament faced by Antiguan planters was 
summarised by Sir Codrington’s chief Antiguan attorney as follows:  
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we are now as dry as ‘tis possible [to be] and the Canes are perishing daily, whilst the 
Season is but already too far advanced to replant with hopes of success or to form any 
great dependence [sic] upon Canes that have been so materially injured in their infant 
State.
61
  
 
Conversely, a resurgence in production in 1781 (Figure 3) was attributed to favourable 
weather that spring.
62
 Rainfall deficiency was, nevertheless, to return for the subsequent two 
years, ‘totally to destroy the hope of the Planter’.63 All the while, the manufacture of sugar 
was undermined by shortages of vital equipment and the replanting of caneland with 
subsistence crops.
64
 However, once famine and disease ensued, an enfeebled workforce 
became planters’ principal challenge. So many slaves had died by June 1780, claimed one of 
Sir Codrington’s correspondents, that even if the year’s crop had been large, ‘there would 
have been almost unsumountable [sic] difficulties in taking it off’.65  
 With the sugar industry as the motor of the colonial economy, it wasn’t long before 
recurrent harvest failure precipitated financial ruin. This emerged first at the plantation level. 
As one anonymous visitor to the island explained in November 1781: 
 
Where there is so great a failure of yearly revenue, the expense of maintaining such a 
number of negroes as is necessary for cultivating these Estates, must be prodigious. The 
plantation unable to yield its accustomed quantity of vegetables is insufficient for the 
support of the negroes settled on it, and the owner must supply the deficiency by 
purchasing, which he is unhappily necessitated to do, at a time when he can least afford 
it.
66
 
 
Pecuniary difficulties were only aggravated by mortality among livestock and the enslaved.
67
 
For instance, loss of the labour of eighty Codrington slaves who perished in 1777 and 1778 
was estimated to have cost the proprietor £4,000.
68
 When subsequent hostilities between 
England and France rendered commercial conditions completely untenable, securing credit 
from merchants became all but impossible.
69
 Thus, many plantations became trapped in a 
cycle of decline; as climatic and geopolitical threats to plantation operations diminished 
investor confidence, the overseas investment needed to sustain production evaporated, 
reducing operational efficiency and output further. The cycle was broken only when 
intractable debt drove proprietors out of the sugar industry altogether. So widespread was 
bankruptcy by the end of 1779, that Antiguan politicians renewed seldom-enforced 
legislation for ‘Preventing the Escape of Debtors’.70 
Linked as they were through taxes and shipping duties, private insolvency quickly 
translated into public insolvency. As mentioned in Section 1, the colonial treasury was 
already depleted by autumn 1777. Military expenditure only mounted thereafter. Government 
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accounts indicate that some £80,000 (which, accounting for inflation, would today amount to 
roughly £5 million) was invested in defence between 1777 and 1783—approximately 80 per 
cent of the total spent from 1776 to 1790.
71
 After teetering at the brink of complete 
insolvency for two years, the colony eventually received British financial aid in 1780 (see 
Section 5). Nevertheless, by 1783, the legislature had again ‘run amazingly into debt’.72  
It is noteworthy that, while discussing connections between the trade embargo, warfare 
and economic downturn, Antiguan officials also repeatedly underscored the significance of 
deficient rainfall.
73
 Particularly emphatic were the words of the Assembly in a three-page 
testimonial on the matter: 
 
For more than seven years… has this unhappy Colony been visited with a Drought, the 
severity of which cannot be more justly described than by a detail of the 
disappointments & Misery it has produced. Our Crops have been destroyed—our 
Labours and Industry frustrated—Our debts accumulated by a deprivation of the only 
means to reduce them. Families falling from Ease & Affluence into Penury and Want, 
have been obliged to abandon the Estates of their Ancestors. Our Lands… [have] 
become sterile, and debarred thereby of our Usual resources, our Expenses in the 
Cultivation of our Plantations have continually increased—Such has been and such is 
still the Situation.
74
 
 
Though revealing much about the structural dimensions of the crisis, it must be recognised 
that the colonial archives offer a notably partial, elite-oriented perspective on human 
experience of climatic and agro-economic deterioration. The brutal realities lived by  
Antiguans of colour are largely only reflected in economic terms—as the loss of productive 
labour or the escalation of feeding and medical costs.
75
 Yet, even these dehumanising 
accounts offer some insights that problematise conventional portrayals of the enslaved as 
units of diminishing stock, passive to the onslaughts of crisis. In July 1780, for example, 
Governor Burt reported that planters ‘had experienced great injury’ as a result of the theft and 
illicit sale of plantation produce by blacks—a response to climate-related food shortages 
known to be common in nineteenth century Antigua.
76
 The white elite also apprehended more 
dangerous slave action. As early as December 1775, Mr. Farley warned: 
 
Famine (the worst of all Evils) approaches fast, which may, & probably will bring on a 
rebellion of our slaves, & as there are about 35,000 of them in this Island, [but] not 
above 4,000 whites, we shall stand a bad chance.
77
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In subsequent years, the same fear was reiterated by Farley as well as Mainswete Walrond.
78
 
For his part, Governor Burt was convinced that his sanctioning of foreign provision imports 
in 1778 (see Section 5) had ‘prevented Insurrections among the slaves’.79  
In the end, Antigua was lucky, for the African-descended masses staged no rebellion 
attempt during the war. Violent slave dissent on a smaller scale did, however, take place at 
least twice. Late in March 1780, head-manager Richard Clarke informed Sir Codrington that 
three of the proprietor’s slaves had been condemned to execution for attempting to poison 
several of his white plantation staff. Clarke also revealed that one of the intended victims, the 
manager of ‘Tuites’ estate, had been the target of a similar attempt 18 months earlier.80 The 
limited detail of related correspondence makes it difficult to establish conclusively the factors 
driving these attacks. That one manager was targeted twice within 18 months suggests that 
his behaviour towards slaves might have been especially antagonistic. Nonetheless, as noted 
above, contemporaries were certain that the hunger then afflicting blacks—to which drought 
contributed significantly—enhanced the threat that they would turn against their masters.81  
 
5. Government interventions to combat crisis 
The drastic times of the American war period invariably prompted colonial administrators to 
take drastic measures. In light of Antigua’s reliance upon imported supplies, amending the 
terms of overseas trade was the first recourse of the legislature when shortages commenced. 
Late in 1775, appeals were made to Craister Greathead, the acting-governor of the Leeward 
Islands, for provision exports from the colony to be prohibited for 30 days. After receiving 
approval from the British Colonial Office, the proposal was sanctioned the following June.
82
 
A year later, endorsement was obtained for a quite different modification to maritime policy: 
the legalisation of anti-American piracy.
83
 This came about after a group of 16 Antiguans 
armed a privately-owned sloop—the aptly-named ‘Reprisal’—and began to maraud 
American shipping in the region. At first, the 16 faced indictment for their action, but 
subsequent public outcry prompted parliament to condone the practise, leading many other 
islanders to embark on their own quests of plunder against the enemy.
84
 As discussed earlier, 
these initial measures, in combination with favourable weather in autumn 1776, ostensibly 
succeeded in staving off serious shortages for a time. However, with the former serving only 
while some provision stocks remained, and the latter affording an irregular supply, more 
cogent action became necessary.  
Early in 1776, the governors of British Caribbean colonies were vested with the power to 
manage severe provision shortages by temporarily authorising imports from non-hostile 
foreign provinces, provided goods were transported by British vessels.
85
 Reacting to the 
famine that threatened Antigua and several neighbouring colonies in the summer of 1777, 
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Governor Burt called for commerce in the Leewards to be liberalised on these terms for six 
months. The commendation of this step by the British monarch seems to have established 
something of a precedent; it was repeated in autumn 1778 and again after supplies elsewhere 
in the region were decimated by the hurricane of October 1780.
86
 Such was the perceived 
danger on these occasions that trade was even permitted in non-enemy foreign vessels.  
By the final years of the 1770s, colonial administrators had to legislate not only for 
scarcities of vital resources, but also fiscal decline. In response to this, in 1778 and 1779, new 
taxes were imposed, procedures implemented to expedite the collection of customs duties and 
additional naval protection granted to commercial shipping.
87
 Yet, by the time the latter 
policies came into effect, Antigua’s interconnected subsistence and credit crisis had 
climaxed, rousing calls for direct British intervention. After legislators petitioning on three 
separate occasions for financial and food aid, British officials acquiesced in the final months 
of 1779. Arrangements were made for bills of exchange totalling £20,000 (equivalent to 
roughly £1,257,000 in modern terms) to be drawn on the royal treasury for the legislature to 
purchase provisions. These were to be dispensed to planters, who would subsequently pay an 
unspecified capitation tax on their slaves as a means of reimbursing the Crown. Meanwhile, 
£17,000 worth of food, which finally arrived in March 1780, was despatched for subsidised 
sale.
88
  
This was not, however, the last that was heard of the relief package. By May 1783, the 
colony had managed to settle just £600 of the combined £37,000 debt to Britain and, 
bankrupt once more, had to suspend further repayments.
89
 Neither was 1779 the last time 
Antiguan administrators sought to allay provision supply problems. To protect the fast-
diminishing reserves that had been accumulated in 1780, exports of foodstuffs and wares 
were again banned temporary the following summer.
90
 Three years later, the legislature also 
petitioned parliament (unsuccessfully) for St. John’s to be given permanent free port status.91 
 
6. Contextualising crisis: the revolutionary period and beyond 
The period of the American Independence War is recorded in the Antiguan archives as one of 
protracted and multifaceted resource scarcities and agro-economic downturn. The sources 
attest in clear terms that these difficulties stemmed from the pressures of international 
conflict and the consequent dislocation of regional trade, coincident with prolonged 
precipitation deficiency. However, can these contemporary narratives be taken at face value? 
As noted by colonial historian Richard Sheridan, planters and planter-dominated legislatures 
in the West Indies may have exaggerated the consequences of warfare and natural disasters in 
order to protect their interests by securing British aid and convincing slaves of the need to cut 
rations. This potential caveat is all the more pertinent given that the war coincides with the 
longest episode of rainfall deficiency in reconstructions of Antiguan precipitation spanning 
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121 years.
92
 Nevertheless, Sheridan himself, alongside historian Lowell Ragatz, has 
concluded that there is abundant evidence of exceptional and genuine hardship throughout 
British Caribbean society at the time.
93
 Such considerations have also been addressed with 
respect to the Antiguan climate reconstructions, which, it is worth noting, were developed 
solely on the basis of direct archival references to weather—that is to say, excluding any 
evidence of the wider environmental and societal impacts of meteorological conditions. 
These weather references, which originated from a diversity of observers, revealed almost 
entirely consistent trends over various timescales.
94
 The same point applies to correspondence 
regarding subsistence and economic difficulties, a considerable proportion of which was 
private and, thus, unlikely intended to mislead British officials or enslaved people. It is 
significant that at no point did private accounts conflict with those provided by successive 
governors of the colony, who were tasked with acting as neutral informants to the Crown 
(though it should be recognised that they, like much of the political elite, also owned sugar 
estates). Moreover, the documentation is replete with biophysical indicators of major drought, 
such as severe water shortages, livestock mortality and wilting vegetation. 
Invariably, the unfaithful transmission of information may affect the recording of any 
episode of disaster. Despite this, the tenor and wealth of contemporary writings leave little 
doubt that the state of emergency that materialised in late 1770s and early 1780s Antigua was 
extraordinary in terms of agro-economic decline and human suffering.
95
 A decisive 
component of this emergency was the occurrence of successive years of deficient rainfall. 
The disproportionate impacts of consecutive and prolonged phases of extreme weather on 
pre-industrial colonial societies have been documented extensively in other climate 
histories.
96
 The present research indicates that the British Caribbean system of nigh-on 
monoculture was especially vulnerable, with repeated harvest failure capable of pushing the 
export-reliant economy from a state of reduced profitability to one of universal bankruptcy. 
Perhaps predictably, in Antigua it was the systematically-deprived slave majority who bore 
the physical brunt of the resulting austerity and the long-standing neglect of subsistence 
agriculture. Whites, who were to a great extent buffered by their material wealth, primarily 
experienced hardship financially. There is evidence, however, that exigencies among slaves 
posed some threat to elites’ very existence, augmenting the potential for servile revolt. 
But what of conditions after the war? Despite the strict enforcement of imperial 
‘Navigation Acts’ from 1783, which dictated that provisions from the newly-independent 
mainland could be transported to the British Caribbean only in colonial shipping, evidence 
indicates that by the late 1780s plantations were as well supplied as before the war.
97
 The 
available sugar production and export data, though discontinuous, suggest a substantial 
resurgence of plantation operations in Antigua at this time (Figure 3). Contemporary 
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meteorological conditions are poorly documented, but no instances of major climatic stress 
are recorded in the archives consulted in this study. It is also suggestive of favourable 
environmental conditions that one resident planter commented that ‘Antigua perhaps never 
knew successive Years better’ than the mid-1780s.98 
There then ensued another two and a half decades featuring bouts of international conflict 
and disruptive weather. Initially, these forces did not coincide, however, offering insights into 
their individual influence over human livelihoods. Prolonged drought returned at a time of 
peace between 1789 and 1791, reportedly occasioning the decimation of Antiguan 
subsistence agriculture and livestock, as well as the decline of sugar yields by ‘near two-
thirds’ throughout the Leewards.99 Notwithstanding these difficulties, there were not the calls 
of universal bankruptcy that had been so common a decade earlier. Such calls were, however, 
heard again in the mid-1790s, when debts associated with the French Revolutionary Wars 
(1792-1802), drought in 1794 and a hurricane in August 1795 prompted local officials to 
petition the Crown—ultimately unsuccessfully—for a £10,000 loan.100 A similar combination 
of stresses is documented ten years later. Scanty precipitation, a tropical cyclone in 
September 1804 and the proclamation of martial law—which suspended agricultural 
operations for six weeks—resulted in a ruinously small harvest in the summer of 1805. With 
the agricultural hiatus costing the colonial treasury £20,000 and a fleet carrying much of the 
year’s meagre crop captured by the enemy, insolvency had become widespread by July.101 
Administrators once more solicited a £10,000 loan, this time successfully.
102
 Records from 
subsequent episodes of environmental and geopolitical stress are scarce. Nonetheless, a 
handful of missionaries’ letters from 1812, when Britain was at war with Napoleonic France 
and the United States, are eerily reminiscent of the situation in the late 1770s. In early 
October, for example, Moravian pastor Joseph Newby wrote:  
 
This year has been a remarkable dry one in this Island[;] this with the American war, 
makes provisions very scarce & dear. Both Black & White [people] feel it severely. 
Indian corn, the principal food for Negroes & Stock, is very high in price & indeed 
scarcely to be got for money.
103
 
 
Despite commonalities with the late 1700s and early 1800s, records indicate that 
government responses during the American Revolution period, like the hardships stimulating 
them, were exceptional. Most significant was the combined £37,000 worth of aid afforded to 
Antigua in 1779. Previously, metropolitan intervention of this nature had been rare in the 
British Caribbean. According to recent climate histories, on just one occasion did Parliament 
allocate significant funds to disaster relief in the region, providing £20,000 for the victims of 
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a fire in Charleston, South Carolina, in 1740.
104
 The only comparable example in Antigua 
appears to have been the decision to absolve the colony of paying £2,500 of royal duties after 
a hurricane in 1772.
105
 Notably, Britain’s vast investment in relief in 1779 may not have 
stemmed purely from humanitarian concern. In their analyses of the even-more-exceptional 
£120,000 grant paid to Barbados and Jamaica after suffering tremendous hurricane damage in 
1780, Matthew Mulcahy and Stuart Schwartz suggest that the move was politically 
motivated; by demonstrating the advantages of subject-hood, it helped to unify Britain and 
her West Indian possessions and ease criticism of wartime policy at a time of revolutionary 
sentiment.
106
 To be sure, pressure from the powerful, pro-planter ‘West Indian Lobby’ in 
British politics would also have been an important factor. The same considerations could 
hardly have escaped Members of Parliament when disaster relief for Antigua was being 
negotiated one year previously. To what extent this earlier action influenced the decision-
making process behind the Jamaican-Barbadian grant is unclear, but the former was 
unquestionably an important precursor. 
Another institutional response to climate-related dearth that became common during the 
chaotic late 1700s and early 1800s was the temporary liberalisation of trade. Free trade with 
politically neutral states also had earlier precedents in the British Caribbean, with Jamaica 
and Dominica having been granted regulated ‘free port’ status in the 1760s.107 Yet, there is no 
evidence—either in the consulted archives or local colonial histories108—of the use of this 
measure by Antiguan administrators before the American war. Subsequently, it apparently 
became a standard emergency procedure. The colony was again opened to foreign imports in 
response to weather-induced shortages in 1789, 1793, 1794 and 1813.
109
 When the legislature 
sought to enact the procedure in 1793, Governor Burt’s admittance of cargoes from foreign 
territories in the late 1770s was explicitly cited as a justification.
110
 Measures such as 
temporarily prohibiting provision exports and legalising acts of piracy against the enemy 
were also adopted after tropical cyclone strikes in 1785, 1812 and 1813.
111
 
Notwithstanding the notion that these kinds of government intervention may have been as 
much about fostering loyalty and appeasing important pressure groups as about reducing 
hardship, an anti-colonial movement was always unlikely for strategic reasons. As discussed 
by Andrew O’Shaughnessy, the vast mismatch between the size of the white and black 
populatiosn of the Lesser Antilles essentially meant that the former was dependent upon a 
British military presence to preserve their ascendancy in the social order.
112
 Indeed, the 
existence of both a British garrison and naval dockyard in Antigua may well explain why the 
intensified misery of local slaves produced no coherent uprising in the colony. 
 
7. Evaluation and conclusions: Antigua and beyond 
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In June 1779, Antigua’s battalion of the Royal 60th Regiment remained in peril. Food and 
water were still scarce, a French invasion seemed imminent and the public treasury was 
exhausted. Ultimately, we can only speculate at what became of the men, for the surviving 
documentation is silent on their fate in the year that followed. They would not die in battle, 
foreign powers launching no direct attack on Antigua during the American war. What is 
certain is that the hardships endured by the soldiers were far from isolated. Between 1775 and 
1783, Antigua was gripped by resource scarcities and economic decline, which, in one way or 
another, impacted upon all sectors of society. It is possible that the receipt of aid from Britain 
in late 1779 enabled colonial administrators to remedy the troops’ sufferings permanently. 
More probable, however, is that some infantrymen were among the hundreds of islanders 
who would succumb to hunger and disease.  
The scenario of environmental and geopolitical turmoil was also far from isolated within 
the Caribbean at large. The literature highlights several other cases in which the troubles of 
the American war were intensified disastrously by adverse weather. In Barbados, for 
example, a familiar succession of precipitation scarcity, crop failure and famine unfolded in 
1777 and 1778, prompting Britain to despatch food aid to the island.
113
 Meanwhile, 
remarkably frequent and destructive tropical cyclones during the 1780s—especially in 1780 
and 1781—are understood to have produced considerable regional adversity.114 The wider 
significance of these climatic shocks has been postulated by Schwartz. In late eighteenth-
century parliamentary debates over the amelioration of the conditions of slavery, he notes, 
some conclusions about slaves’ wellbeing were founded upon the abysmal situation observed 
in the aftermath of the storms.
115
 Antigua may have been spared major cyclone damage at this 
time, but, in the context of unrelenting drought, circumstances there were likely just as bad as 
elsewhere. Several studies have proposed that successive climate-related crises in the second 
half of the 1700s were also pivotal to other political developments in the Caribbean, 
including the outcome of major military campaigns, rebellions and suspensions of 
mercantilist trade restrictions.
116
 The present research contributes by illustrating that, at least 
in Antigua, the American Independence War marked an important watershed in free-trade 
transforming from a novel and exceptional measure to an established emergency policy. As 
regards the coordination of humanitarian and economic relief from Britain, it is also apparent 
that the case of Antigua fitted within a broader framework of colonial crisis management. 
Sherry Johnson has highlighted the concurrence of frequent meteorological extremes in 
this era with a roughly fifty-year global warm anomaly, starting around 1750 during the Little 
Ice Age (c. 1400-1850). Following on from this, Johnson notes that a recent climate 
reconstruction exhibits exceptional numbers of El Niño and La Niña cycles in the period 
1748-1804—18 of the former and 31 of the latter—which may have resulted in more frequent 
extreme weather events in the tropical Atlantic.
117
 Such observations have important 
implications for understanding societal vulnerability in the late eighteenth-century British 
West Indies. It is evident that recurrent warfare at the time rendered this import-reliant 
dominion peculiarly susceptible to additional strains on food supplies and finances. If one 
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follows Johnson’s line of argumentation, it may be that macro-scale atmospheric processes at 
once made the occurrence of strains of a meteorological nature more probable. 
While the present study does not enable a comprehensive evaluation of this suggestion, it 
has afforded a detailed lens on the dynamics of these converging societal and environmental 
vulnerabilities within a specific geography. Archival evidence demonstrates that the 
exigencies experienced in Antigua between 1775 and 1783 cannot be explained solely by the 
international conflict and trade embargo for which that period is best known. Regional 
geopolitical and commercial pressures interacted intricately with local nutritional, 
epidemiological, social and agro-economic circumstances, which deteriorated significantly as 
a result of drought. High death tolls in other British Caribbean colonies suggest that famine 
was, perhaps, inevitable with the suspension of trade with the rebelling Thirteen Colonies. 
Nevertheless, the firsthand accounts of Antiguans leave little doubt that the destruction of 
subsistence crops by drought contributed considerably to its human cost. Similarly, recurrent 
failure of sugar harvests, which saw the collapse of public and private finances, resulted from 
the non-arrival of plantation stores and deficient rainfall. Successive years of climatic stress 
thus gained special resonance in the highly precarious socio-economic and political milieu in 
which they unfolded. By exploring the critical role of such natural forces, which have 
previously received limited scrutiny from historiographers,
118
 this study has sought to shine 
new light on an otherwise well-studied chapter of the British Caribbean’s colonial past. 
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